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Abstract
We consider the problem of secure distributed data storage under the paradigm of weak security, in which no
meaningful information is leaked to the eavesdropper. More specifically, the eavesdropper cannot get any information
about any individual message file or a small group of files. The key benefit of the weak security paradigm is that
it incurs no loss in the storage capacity, which makes it practically appealing.
In this paper, we present a coding scheme, using a coset coding based outer code and a Product-Matrix
Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating code (proposed by Rashmi et al.) as an inner code, that achieves weak security
when the eavesdropper can observe any single storage node. We show that the proposed construction has good
security properties and requires small finite field size.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSS) have recently received significant research attention due to their
important applications in data centers and cloud networks. To achieve reliability in DSS, some form of
redundancy is introduced using either replication or erasure coding. Erasure coding is attractive in terms of
storage efficiency, but it requires large amount of data to be downloaded during the repair of a failed node.
To address this problem, Dimakis et al. [1] introduced a new class of codes, referred to as Regenerating
Codes, which significantly reduce the amount of data downloaded during the repair process.
Specifically, Dimakis et al. [1], [2] showed that there exists a trade-off between storage space per node
and repair bandwidth for single node failure, and that regenerating codes optimally achieve this trade-off.
The codes on one extreme point of the optimal storage-repair bandwidth trade-off curve that minimize
the repair bandwidth are referred to as Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) codes; whereas, the
codes on the other extreme point that minimize storage per node are referred to as Minimum Storage
Regenerating (MSR) codes. Several explicit code constructions have been proposed for exact regenerating
codes (see [3] and references therein). In this paper, we utilize product-matrix MBR codes [4], since these
codes can be constructed for the entire range of parameters and require small finite field size.
Another important challenge for a DSS is the security of the stored data. For instance, some of the
storage nodes in the cloud networks owned by certain private organizations can be eavesdropped. Providing
secrecy against eavesdropping is particularly challenging in DSS because of their dynamic nature, with
nodes continually failing and being repaired. At any point of time, an eavesdropper Eve can observe any
subset of nodes of bounded size.
DSS can be secured using either conventional cryptographic techniques or information-theoretic ap-
proaches. One major drawback of almost all the secret key based encryption techniques is that they
require secret key management mechanisms, which incur significant computational and communication
overhead. Therefore, in the distributed setting of DSS, providing information-theoretic secrecy might be
advantageous.
Information-theoretic model for securing regenerating codes was introduced by Pawar et al. [5], [6].
Since then, a number of investigations have been carried out on characterizing outer-bounds on secrecy
capacity and the associated achievable schemes (see [7], [8], [9]). All these results are focussed on the
paradigm of information-theoretic perfect secrecy. Essentially, perfect secrecy requires that the eavesdrop-
per gains absolutely no information about the stored data from its observations.
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2To be precise, suppose that a DSS is storing Bs message files S = {S1, . . . , SBs}, where each file can
be considered as a symbol in a finite field Fq. Let E denote the set of (encoded) symbols that Eve can
observe. A DSS is said to be perfectly secure if the mutual information between the message symbols S
and the eavesdropped symbols E is zero, i.e., I (S;E) = 0.
For many practical storage systems, this condition might be too strong. Moreover, coding schemes that
provide perfect secrecy involve mixing data symbols with random keys to confuse the eavesdropper, which
incurs loss in the storage capacity. Considering these drawbacks of the perfect secrecy notion, we focus
on the notion of weak secrecy [10].1
The notion of weak secrecy requires that an eavesdropper gains no information about any individual mes-
sage file. For example, let the number of files be Bs = 4, and the size of finite field be q = 7. Further, sup-
pose that Eve observes the following two encoded symbolsE = {S1 + S2 + S3 + S4, S1 + 2S2 + 3S3 + 4S4}.
Then, Eve cannot get any information about any individual message file, when the files are uniformly
random and independent of each other.
Furthermore, weak secrecy requires that even if Eve can obtain some g number of files as a side
information, it should not be able to decode for any other file. For instance, if Eve has a side-information
of g = 1 file, she cannot decode for any other file observing E. Essentially, weakly secure coding schemes
use data packets as keys, and thus, do not incur loss in capacity.
Despite of its practical benefits, there have been relatively very few attempts on employing weak secrecy
for DSS. In [11], Oliveira et al. present a construction of weakly secure erasure codes for DSS without
considering the regeneration aspects. Very recently, Dau et al. [12] have analyzed the weak secrecy
properties of two families of regenerating codes: regular-graph codes [13] and product-matrix codes [4].
In this paper, going a step ahead from [12], we focus on designing outer codes to improve the weak
secrecy properties of regenerating codes. To be specific, we present explicit construction of a coset coding
based outer code to weakly secure product-matrix (PM) codes operating at MBR point (referred to as PM-
MBR codes) [4] for the scenario wherein Eve can observe any single storage node. The proposed coding
scheme has numerous advantages. First, it enhances the weak secrecy properties of the PM-MBR codes
in terms of the amount of side-information g that Eve can have without being able to decode any new
file. In particular, when the size of the stored data is large, the gain in g achieved by the proposed coding
scheme is twofold. Second, the proposed outer codes leverage the elegant structure that is present in the
PM codes, and thus, require small finite field size. Finally, the weak-secrecy capacity of the proposed
coding scheme is nearly equal2 to the non-secure storage capacity. These features make the proposed
coding scheme attractive in practical settings.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Regenerating Codes
Suppose we need to store a file S = {S1, . . . , SB} containing B symbols, each drawn uniformly and
independently from a finite field Fq, across n storage nodes, where each node is capable of storing α
symbols. A regenerating code encodes the B message symbols into nα symbols in such a way that it
satisfies the following two properties. First, a data collector (DC) connecting to any k out of n nodes
is able to reconstruct the entire file; this is referred to as the reconstruction property. Second, when a
storage node is failed, it is regenerated by adding a new node which downloads β symbols each from
any d out of the remaining n− 1 nodes; this is referred to as the regeneration property. A regenerating
code with these parameters is referred to as an (n, k, d, α, β) regenerating code.
Under these requirements, the outer bound on the capacity of an (n, k, d, α, β) regenerating code is
given as [2]
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d− i)β} (1)
1Note that the notion of weak secrecy that is introduced in [10] and considered throughout this paper, is different from the conventional
notion of information-theoretic weak secrecy, which is defined for asymptotically large block-lengths. The weak secrecy notion considered
in this paper is applicable to finite block-lengths as well.
2For all parameters, the weakly secure capacity of the proposed scheme is two units below the non-secure storage capacity, which is
negligible when the non-secure capacity is large.
3For Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) codes, first the repair bandwidth dβ is minimized and
then the storage per node α is minimized. Specifically, for an (n, k, d, α, β = 1) MBR code, we have
B =
∑k−1
i=0 (d − i), and α = d. If the regenerated node is an exact replica of the failed node, then the
repair model is said to be exact repair [13]. In this paper, we focus on a special class of exact minimum
bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes called as the product-matrix codes [4], which are described in
section II-D.
B. Eavesdropper Model
The most generalized eavesdropper model for a DSS, called as the (l1, l2)-eavesdropper model, is
considered in [9] (see also [7]). An (l1, l2)-eavesdropper, Eve, can access the data stored on any l1 nodes,
and the data downloaded during the regeneration of any l2 nodes.
Notice that at MBR point, the number of downloaded symbols is equal to the number of stored symbols.
Therefore, Eve cannot gain any additional information by observing the data downloaded during the
regeneration, and thus, it is sufficient to simply consider the total number of nodes l := l1 + l2 that Eve
has access to.
In this paper, we assume that Eve can access any one storage node. Thus, we have l = 1. We assume
that Eve is passive, has unbounded computational power, and has the knowledge of the coding scheme
being used.
C. Information-theoretic Secrecy
Suppose S = {S1, . . . , SBs} denote the Bs message files where each file Si ∈ Fq, and E denotes Eve’s
observations. A DSS is said to be perfectly secure if I (S;E) = 0. Under this requirement, Pawar et
al. [5] characterized an upper bound on the secrecy capacity as:
Bs ≤
k−1∑
i=l
min{α, (d− i)β} (2)
Comparing (1) and (2), we can say that in a perfectly secure DSS, the l nodes that are compromised
by the eavesdropper cannot effectively contain any useful information. Consequently, the perfect secrecy
requirement results in a loss of storage capacity, i.e., Bs < B.
Remark 1. Shah et al. [7] show that PM-MBR codes can be made perfectly secure against an (l1, l2)
eavesdropper by appropriately mixing random keys with the message symbols. The secure codes achieve
the capacity outer bound given in (2), and the loss of capacity incurred due to perfect secrecy requirement
is B −Bs = ld−
(
l
2
)
.
In this paper, we focus on a relaxed, yet practically appealing, notion of weak secrecy [10]. A DSS is
said to be weakly secure if I (Si;E) = 0, ∀i ∈ [Bs], where [Bs] := {1, . . . , Bs}. Furthermore, suppose
Eve is able to obtain, as a side information, some g message symbols denoted as SG := {Si : i ∈ G} for
some G ⊂ [Bs] such that |G| = g. Then, a DSS is said to be weakly secure against g guesses if we have
I (Si;E|SG) = 0 ∀i ∈ [Bs] \ G, ∀G ⊂ [Bs] : |G| ≤ g. (3)
In [14], it was shown that the above condition is equivalent to
I (SG′;E) = 0 ∀G
′ ⊆ [Bs] : |G
′| ≤ g + 1. (4)
Essentially, this condition implies that in a scheme that is weakly secure against g guesses, it is not
possible for Eve to obtain any information about any subset of g + 1 symbols from her observations.3
3In [12], a scheme that is weakly secure against g−1 guesses is called as a g-block secure scheme, following condition (4) as a definition
of g-block security.
4D. Recap of Product-Matrix MBR Codes
Let us review the Product-Matrix framework based MBR Codes (PM-MBR Codes) proposed in [4].
The PM-MBR code is obtained by taking the product of an (n × d) encoding matrix Ψ and a (d × α)
message matrix M that contains the B message symbols arranged in a particular fashion. Specifically,
the encoding matrix Ψ and the message matrix M have the following structure
Ψ︸︷︷︸
n×d
=
[
Φ︸︷︷︸
n×k
∆︸︷︷︸
n×(d−k)
]
, M︸︷︷︸
d×d
=


M1︸︷︷︸
k×k
M2︸︷︷︸
k×(d−k)
MT2︸︷︷︸
(d−k)×k
0︸︷︷︸
(d−k)×(d−k)

 (5)
In the message matrix M , the component matrix M1 is a k×k symmetric matrix which contains k(k+1)2
data symbols in the upper triangular half; whereas, the other component matrix M2 is a k× (d−k) matrix
which contains the remaining k(d − k) message symbols. Note that at MBR point, B =
∑k−1
i=0 (d− i) =
k(k+1)
2
+ k(d− k).
The matrices Φ and ∆ are chosen in such a way that any k rows of Φ are linearly independent, and
any d rows of Ψ are linearly independent. If Ψ is chosen to be a Vandermonde or a Cauchy matrix, these
requirements are satisfied. Note that the field size q depends on the choice of the encoding matrix Ψ. For
instance, if Ψ is a Vandermonde matrix, then field sixe of q ≥ n is both necessary and sufficient.
The α symbols stored on the i-th node are given by Ci = ΨiM , where Ψi denotes the i-th row of Ψ.
The regeneration and the reconstruction processes can be found in [4].
Example: Consider a (n = 5, k = 3, d = 4, α = 4, β = 1) PM-MBR code. Then, from (1), we have
B = 9. Let the data to be stored is given as X = {x1, · · · , x9}, where xi ∈ Fq ∀i. Suppose the encoding
matrix Ψ is a Cauchy matrix. Then, in parametric form, we have
Ψ =
[
1
ai + bj
]5,4
i=1,j=1
, M =


x1 x2 x3 x4
x2 x5 x6 x7
x3 x6 x8 x9
x4 x7 x9 0

 , (6)
where ai, bj ∈ Fq such that ai 6= bj and ai + bj 6= 0 for all i, j. Note that, to satisfy these requirements,
we need at least n + d = 9 distinct elements, and thus, we require q ≥ 9.
III. EXPLICIT CODE CONSTRUCTION FOR WEAK SECURITY
A. Summary of Main Results
We propose an explicit construction of coset coding based outer code for PM-MBR inner code that
achieves weak secrecy when Eve can observe any single storage node, i.e., l = 1. The proposed scheme
works for the entire range of parameters [n, k, d] that are feasible for DSS. The weak secrecy capacity
of the proposed scheme is Bs = B − 2, where B is the capacity without any secrecy requirement. The
proposed scheme is weakly secure against g ≤ d+ k − 4 number of guesses.
B. Outer Code Based on Coset Coding
We propose to use an outer code to improve the weak secrecy level (i.e., the amount of side information
that Eve can have) of the PM-MBR codes. When outer code is used, the overall encoding consists of
two steps. First, an outer code is used to encode the length-Bs message file S = [S1 . . . SBs ] ∈ FBsq into
a codeword X = [X1 . . . XB] ∈ FBq . Next, the codeword X is encoded using the PM-MBR code (as an
inner code) by populating the entries of matrix M (see (5)) with codeword symbols X . Notice that the
regeneration process remains the same. To obtain the message file S, a user would first decode X using
the reconstruction process of the PM-MBR code, and then, decode the outer code to get S.
We design the outer code based on coset coding [15]. A coset code is constructed using a (B,B−Bs)
linear code C over Fq with parity-check matrix H ∈ FBs×Bq . Specifically, the message file S is encoded
5by selecting uniformly at random some X ∈ FBq such that S = HX . Therefore, the message file can be
considered as a syndrome specifying a coset of C, and the codeword X is a randomly chosen element of
that coset. Notice that the decoding operation of a coset code consists of simply computing the syndrome
S = HX .
To design the matrix H appropriately, we need to transform the weak secrecy condition (4) into a
condition involving H . For this, we use the following result from [14, Lemma 6], which is a generalization
of [16, Theorem 1].
Lemma 1. ([14]) Suppose a coset code based on a parity-check matrix H ∈ FBs×Bq is used as an outer
code over a given exact regenerating code to store the message S = {S1, · · · , SBs}. Suppose each message
symbol Si for i ∈ [Bs] is chosen uniformly and independently. Let E = GX be the µ linearly independent
symbols observed by an eavesdropper. Then, for any G ′ ⊆ [Bs] : |G ′| ≤ B − µ, we have
I (SG′;E) = rankHG′ + rankG− rank
[
HG′
G
]
, (7)
where HG′ is a sub-matrix of H formed by choosing the rows indexed by the set G ′.
Then, weak secrecy would be satisfied by designing H and G such that
rank
[
HG′
G
]
= rank HG′ + rank G, ∀G ′ ⊂ [Bs] : |G ′| ≤ g + 1. (8)
C. Outer Code Construction for PM-MBR Codes
As previously mentioned in section II-B, we assume that Eve can observe any single storage node. Let
e denote the index of the node that Eve can access. Eve observes α = d symbols stored on node e given
by E = ψeM , where ψe is the e-th row of Ψ. To use condition (8), we need to find a matrix Ge such that
E = GeX . This is carried out by a simple linear transformation that guarantees E = (ψeM)T = GeX .
To describe the transformation formally, assume without loss of generality, that the B outer-coded sym-
bols X = {X1, . . . , XB} are filled in the message matrix M in a lexicographic order for 1 ≤ j ≤ d and 1 ≤
i ≤ k. Therefore, if M(i,j) denotes the symbol at i-th row and j-th column of M , then we have M(1,1) = X1,
M(1,2) = X2, . . ., M(k,d) = XB . Equivalently, we have X = {M(1,1), . . . ,M(1,d),M(2,2), . . . ,M(2,d), . . . ,M(k,k), . . . ,M(k,d)}.
Further, notice that M is a symmetric matrix. Thus, if M(i,j) = Xb, then we have M(j,i) = Xb as well.
Under this setting, the symbols observed by Eve can be written as E = GeX , where (i, b)-th entry of
the d× B matrix Ge is given as
Ge(i, b) =
{
Ψ(e,j) ifM(i,j) = Xb for some j ∈ [d],
0 otherwise, (9)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d and 1 ≤ b ≤ B. Note that Ge can be considered as a generator matrix of PM-MBR code
for node e. To ensure weak security against g guesses, we need to design H such that for each node
e ∈ [n], its generator matrix Ge satisfies (8).
Example: For the previous example of (n = 6, k = 4, d = 5, α = 5, β = 1) PM-MBR code, if Eve
observes the first node then we can write G1 as (10) (shown at the top of the page).
G1 =


Ψ(1, 1) Ψ(1, 2) Ψ(1, 3) Ψ(1, 4) 0 0 0 0 0
0 Ψ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψ(1, 2) Ψ(1, 3) Ψ(1, 4) 0 0
0 0 Ψ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψ(1, 2) 0 Ψ(1, 3) Ψ(1, 4)
0 0 0 Ψ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψ(1, 2) 0 Ψ(1, 3)

 (10)
Remark 2. Observe that the matrix Ge for each node e ∈ [n] is sparse. In particular, Ge for each node
e ∈ [n] contains at least one row vector with Hamming weight k. Thus, PM-MBR codes are not secure
against g ≥ k − 1 guesses, when Eve can observe one storage node. This shows the necessity to employ
an outer code to improve the level of weak secrecy.
6Remark 3. It is possible to use a random matrix as H , however it would require very large field size.
This is because the condition (8) must be satisfied for all sub-matrices of H , the number of which are
exponentially large. Moreover, for each sub-matrix HG′ , we must ensure (8) for each node e ∈ [n], since
Eve can observe any storage node. Therefore, we explicitly construct H that requires small field size.
Our aim is to jointly design a PM-MBR code and a coset code such that (8) is satisfied. Notice that
while designing PM-MBR codes, the only degree of freedom that we have is in choosing the encoding
matrix Ψ such that the conditions specified in section II-D are satisfied.
The main idea of our solution is to construct H such that it has the same structure as that of the
generator matrix Ge of a node for the PM-MBR code. The same structure of Ge and H would enable us
to ensure the condition (8).
Since GeX = ψeM , the values of the non-zero entries in Ge are specified by ψe and their locations
depend on the elements of M . Further, the location of non-zero entries in Ge are the same for all nodes
e ∈ [n]. To formally specify this structure present in Ge, we introduce the notion of type. We say that a
length-B row vector h(j) is of type j if the indices of its non-zero coefficients are the same as that of
i-th row of Ge; the values of the non-zero coefficients can be different. We call the corresponding set of
indices of non-zero coefficients as the index set of type j, denoted as I (j). Observe that, essentially, the
type of a vector specifies the locations of the non-zero coefficients of the vector. Further, the total number
of types is equal to the number of rows of Ge which is d.
Example: Considering our running example, a vector of type 4 has the form h(4) =
[
0 0 0 γ 0 0 γ2 0 γ3
]
for some γ ∈ Fq. The corresponding index set of type 4 is I (4) = {4, 7, 9}, which corresponds to the
indices of elements of fourth column of M (see (6)).
We construct H such that each row of H belongs to one of the d types. Let θi denote the number of
row vectors of type i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, that are present in H . Define θ := [θ1 · · · θd], which we call as the type
cardinality vector. For each θi > 0, let Hi denote the θi×B sub-matrix of H that is composed of all row
vectors of type i.
Once the type of a row vector is fixed, it is sufficient to give a set of values of non-zero coefficients
to fully specify the row vector. For example, the non-zero coefficient values of all the vectors in Ge are
specified by the row vector ψe. In a similar manner, we represent the non-zero coefficients of all the row
vectors in H using a matrix Ψˆ. Specifically, a d×d matrix Ψˆ is defined in such a way that the j-th row of
Ψˆ specifies the non-zero coefficient values of the j-th vector of type i that is present in H for i, j ∈ [d].
We call the matrix Ψˆ as the coefficient matrix. Observe that the type cardinality vector θ along with the
coefficient matrix Ψˆ are sufficient to specify the parity-check matrix H .
In the following, we describe an explicit construction of the encoding matrix Ψ and the parity check
matrix H (in terms of θ and Ψˆ), which improves the security performance of the PM-MBR codes beyond
g = k − 1 guesses (see remark 2).
Construction 1. First, choose the type cardinality vector θ as follows.
θi =


0 if i = 1,
d− k + i if 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
d− 1 if i = k,
1 if k + 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
(11)
Note that max1≤i≤d θi = d− 1.
Next, choose an n × d encoding matrix Ψ and a d × d coefficient matrix Ψˆ in such a way that any
square sub-matrix of Ψ˜ :=
[
Ψ
Ψˆ
]
is non-singular.
Finally, using Ψˆ and θ, construct H as follows. For each θi, 2 ≤ i ≤ d, the θi × B sub-matrix Hi of
H is given as
Hi(p, b) =
{
Ψˆ(p,j) ifM(i,j) = Xb for some j ∈ [d],
0 otherwise,
(12)
7for 1 ≤ p ≤ θi and 1 ≤ b ≤ B. The parity-check matrix H is obtained by vertically concatenating the
sub-matrices Hi, i.e., H =
[
HT2 H
T
3 . . . H
T
d
]T
.
Note that the requirement on Ψ˜ mentioned in Construction 1, that any of its square sub-matrices should
be non-singular, can be ensured, for example, by choosing Ψ˜ as a Cauchy matrix. Another construction
of a matrix that satisfies this requirement can be found in [17]. Both these constructions require that
q ≥ n+ 2d.
There are couple of points about this requirement on Ψ˜ that are worth mentioning. First, note that this
requirement on Ψ˜ implies that any square sub-matrix of Ψ should also be non-singular. This is a stronger
requirement, which guarantees the two requirements on Ψ that are mentioned in section II-D. Second,
choosing Ψ as a Vandermonde matrix, which is good enough to meet the requirements of PM-MBR
codes, is not sufficient, since a Vandermonde matrix defined over finite field can contain singular square
sub-matrices (see [17], also [12]).
Example: For the running example, construction 1 yields θ = {0, 3, 3, 1}. Let the 5×4 encoding matrix
Ψ be a Cauchy matrix (cf. (6)). We choose Ψˆ such that Ψˆ =
[
Ψ
Ψˆ
]
is also a Cauchy matrix. Note that this
requires q ≥ 13. Then, the resulting parity-check matrix H is given in (13).
H =


0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) Ψˆ(1, 3) Ψˆ(1, 4) 0 0
0 Ψˆ(2, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(2, 2) Ψˆ(2, 3) Ψˆ(2, 4) 0 0
0 Ψˆ(3, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(3, 2) Ψˆ(3, 3) Ψˆ(3, 4) 0 0
0 0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) 0 Ψˆ(1, 3) Ψˆ(1, 4)
0 0 Ψˆ(2, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(2, 2) 0 Ψˆ(2, 3) Ψˆ(2, 4)
0 0 Ψˆ(3, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(3, 2) 0 Ψˆ(3, 3) Ψˆ(3, 4)
0 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) 0 Ψˆ(1, 3)


(13)
D. Analysis
First, we characterize the file size that can be stored in a weakly secure sense by using the proposed
outer code along with a PM-MBR code.
Theorem 1. When an outer coset code based on the parity-check matrix H given in Construction 1 is
used along with a PM-MBR code, the weakly secure storage capacity is Bs = B − 2.
Proof: See appendix
Next, we compute the level of secrecy that can be attained using the proposed outer code along with
a PM-MBR code.
Theorem 2. An outer coset code based on the parity-check matrix H given in Construction 1 makes a
PM-MBR code weakly secure against g ≤ d+ k − 4 guesses.
Proof: See Appendix
Remark 4. In [12], it is shown that, when Eve observes l nodes, the PM-MBR codes using Cauchy
matrix as their encoding matrix are weakly secure against k− l− 1 guesses. Thus, for l = 1, it is shown
that PM-MBR codes are secure against k − 2 guesses. Our proposed encoding enhances the level of
security to d + k − 4 guesses, which is an improvement of d − 2 for all set of parameters (except for
d = k = 2). Notice that, for any regenerating code, d ≥ k. Thus, for large k, the enhancement achieved
by the proposed scheme is almost twofold in terms of the number of guesses that Eve can make and still
cannot learn anything about any single message symbol.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Notice that the message file, which is securely stored, can be considered as the syndrome of the coset
code as S = HX . Thus, the weak-secrecy capacity is the dimension of matrix H . First, we show that,
8if H is designed following construction 1, it contains B − 2 rows. Next, we show that H is full-rank to
prove the result.
Now, notice that the total number of rows in H is equal to
∑d
i=1 θi. From (11), we have
d∑
i=1
θi = 0 +
(
k−1∑
i=2
d− k + i
)
+ (d− 1) + (d− k)
=
(
k−2∑
i=1
d− i
)
+ (d− 1) + (d− k)
(a)
=
(
k−1∑
i=0
d− i
)
− 2
(b)
= B − 2 (14)
where (a) can be easily obtained by carrying out simple algebraic manipulations, and (b) follows from (1)
and from the fact that at MBR point α = d (we assume that β = 1).
To prove that H is full-rank, we show that it is possible to append two rows to H in such a way that
the resulting B×B matrix, denoted as H ′, is non-singular. Specifically, append a type 1 row vector with
non-zero coefficients corresponding to the first row of Ψˆ, and append a type k row vector with non-zero
coefficients corresponding to the d-th row of Ψˆ. From (11), it is easy to see that H ′ contains d− (k − i)
rows of type i for k ≥ i ≥ 2, one row of type 1, and one row each of types k + 1 through d. Without
loss of generality, assume that the rows of H are ordered in such a way that first d rows are of type k,
next d− 1 rows are of type k − 1 and so on up to d− (k − 2) rows of type 2. The last d− k + 1 rows
are of types k + 1 through d and of type 1, respectively.
Now, for proving non-singularity of H ′, consider a system of linear equations Z = H ′Y , where Y =
[Y1 · · ·YB] and Z = [Z1 · · ·ZB] are length-B vectors of variables Y1 through YB and Z1 through ZB,
respectively. We show that it is possible to successively decode variables in Y in terms of variables in Z
by leveraging the elegant structure of H ′.
To describe the process of successive decoding, we need to introduce some notation. Recall that the
type of a row vector specifies the locations of the non-zero coefficients of the vector. The corresponding
set of locations of non-zero coefficients of a type i vector is referred to as the index set of type i, denoted
as I (i). Define Y [I (i)] := {Yl : l ∈ I (i)}, i.e., Y [I (i)] is the vector of elements of Y that are indexed
by the index set of type i.
Suppose we write vector Y in the format of matrix M (see (5)) in a lexicographic order. Notice that the
index set of type i is the set of indices of the elements in the i-th column of M . Observing the structure
of M , we divide the d types into two groups. The types 1 through k are called as group I, while the
types k + 1 through d are called as group II. For any group I type, the index set consists of d elements,
i.e., |I (i) | = d, ∀i ∈ [k]. On the other hand, for any group II type, the corresponding index set has k
elements, i.e., |I (i) | = k ∀i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , d}. Further, index set corresponding to any group I has one
index common with the index sets of all other types, i.e., |I (i) ∩ I (j) | = 1 ∀i < j : i ∈ [k]. Whereas,
any pair of index sets of group II types has no common symbol, i.e., |I (i)∩ I (j) | = 0 ∀k < i < j ≤ d.
Let γ1 and γ2 denote the number of row vectors in H ′ of group I and group II types, respectively.
Algorithm 1 presented below decodes elements of Y [I (i)] for each i ∈ [d] successively.
Claim 1. Algorithm 1 decodes all the B elements of Y in terms of Z.
Proof: The algorithm begins with type k, of which there are d row vectors in H ′. By the construction
of H ′, the non-zero coefficient values are the elements of the d× d Cauchy matrix Ψˆ. Thus, it is possible
to solve for Y [I (k)] by inverting Ψˆ. Next, we prove by induction that, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, if the elements
of I (i+ 1) through I (k) have been decoded, then it is possible to decode the elements of I (i). By
construction of H ′, there are d − k + i rows of type i in H ′ for 2 ≤ i ≤ k with non-zero coefficients
given by Ψˆ1:(d−k+i), respectively. This forms a system of d− k+ i linear equations in d variables of I (i)
9Algorithm 1 Successive decoding for Z = H ′Y
1: Set γ1 = d, γ2 = k
2: for p = k to 2 do
3: Consider set of equations corresponding to γ1 rows of type p as Z[I (p)] = Ψˆ1:γ1Y [I (p)]
4: Using perviously decoded elements, decode for elements of Y located at
I (p) \
(⋃k−p
l=1 (I (p) ∩ I (p+ l))
)
5: γ1 = γ1 − 1, γ2 = γ2 − 1
6: end for
7: Decode for the remaining elements in index sets of types k + 1 through d
8: Decode for the remaining single element of type 1
as Z[I (i)] = Ψˆ1:(d−k+i)Y [I (i)]. Note that, since type i is a group I type, there is one element common
between I (i) and each of I (i+ 1) through I (k). Thus, there are k−i elements in I (i) that have already
been decoded. As any square sub-matrix of Ψˆ is non-singular by construction (it is a Cauchy matrix), it
is possible to solve for the un-decoded d− k + i variables using Z[I (i)] = Ψˆ1:(d−k+i)Y [I (i)].
At the end of the first for loop, k − 1 elements from I (j) for each j ∈ [d] are decoded. Thus, in each
of the index sets of group II types, there is just one element to be decoded. By construction, H ′ has one
row in each of the group II types, and thus, it is possible to decode all the elements in group II index
sets. Note that, at this point, all the elements from index sets of all types except type 1 are decoded.
Finally, since I (1) has one element common with all the remaining d−1 index sets, only single element
from I (1) remains to be decoded, which can be decoded using a row of type 1 that is appended to H .
Notice that, as each index set corresponds to a column of matrix M , we have
⋃d
j=1 I (j) = {Y1, . . . , YB}.
Therefore, algorithm 1 decodes all the B elements of Y .
Remark 5. Note that successively decoding for the variables of a particular type is equivalent to
performing Gaussian elimination on the corresponding rows of that particular type. Thus, in essence,
the procedure for successive decoding gives the order in which Gaussian elimination can be performed
in H ′.
Example: Consider the following H given in (15), which follows from construction 1. To form H ′,
first append a row vector of type 3 with non-zero coefficients specified by Ψˆ4. Then, append a row vector
of type 1 with non-zero coefficients specified by Ψˆ1. See equation (16). To prove that H ′ is full-rank,
observe that we can decode for variables indexed by I (3) = {2, 5, 6, 7} using the four rows of type 3.
Notice that I (3)∩I (2) = 6. Then, using the three rows of type 2 and already decoded variable at index
6, solve for variables indexed by I (2) \ (I (3) ∩ I (2)) = {3, 8, 9}. Then, using the row vector of type
4, decode for I (4) \ ((I (4)∩ I (3))∪ (I (4)∩ I (2))) = {4}. Finally, using the row of type one, decode
for I (1) \ ((I (1) ∩ I (4)) ∪ (I (1) ∩ I (3)) ∪ (I (1) ∩ I (2))) = {1}. The successive decoding uses the
property that any square sub-matrix of the Cauchy matrix Ψˆ is non-singular.
H =


0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) Ψˆ(1, 3) Ψˆ(1, 4) 0 0
0 Ψˆ(2, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(2, 2) Ψˆ(2, 3) Ψˆ(2, 4) 0 0
0 Ψˆ(3, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(3, 2) Ψˆ(3, 3) Ψˆ(3, 4) 0 0
0 0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) 0 Ψˆ(1, 3) Ψˆ(1, 4)
0 0 Ψˆ(2, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(2, 2) 0 Ψˆ(2, 3) Ψˆ(2, 4)
0 0 Ψˆ(3, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(3, 2) 0 Ψˆ(3, 3) Ψˆ(3, 4)
0 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) 0 Ψˆ(1, 3)


(15)
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H ′ =


0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) Ψˆ(1, 3) Ψˆ(1, 4) 0 0
0 Ψˆ(2, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(2, 2) Ψˆ(2, 3) Ψˆ(2, 4) 0 0
0 Ψˆ(3, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(3, 2) Ψˆ(3, 3) Ψˆ(3, 4) 0 0
0 0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) 0 Ψˆ(1, 3) Ψˆ(1, 4)
0 0 Ψˆ(2, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(2, 2) 0 Ψˆ(2, 3) Ψˆ(2, 4)
0 0 Ψˆ(3, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(3, 2) 0 Ψˆ(3, 3) Ψˆ(3, 4)
0 0 Ψˆ(4, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(4, 2) 0 Ψˆ(4, 3) Ψˆ(4, 4)
0 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) 0 Ψˆ(1, 3)
Ψˆ(1, 1) Ψˆ(1, 2) Ψˆ(1, 3) Ψˆ(1, 4) 0 0 0 0 0


(16)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Essentially, we need to prove that condition (8) always holds for the proposed coding scheme as long
as |G ′| ≤ d + k − 3. For notational convenience, let T :=
[
HG′
Ge
]
. Notice that there are
(
Bs
|G′|
)
number of
ways to choose a particular |G ′|, and we ensure (8) for each possible HG′ as long as |G ′| ≤ d+ k − 3.
Since H is full-rank as shown in theorem 1, its sub-matrix HG′ will be full rank for any G ′ ⊆ [Bs].
Further, it has been shown in [7] that for PM-MBR codes each storage node stores α linearly independent
symbols, thus, it follows that Ge is full-rank. Therefore, to prove (8), we need to prove that the matrix T
is full-rank. We divide the proof into three cases: k ≥ 3, k = 2, and k = 1.
Case 1: k ≥ 3.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we show that, if |G ′| ≤ d + k − 3, it is always possible to append
B−|G ′|−α rows of appropriate types to T in such a way that the resulting B×B matrix is non-singular.
In the following, we present an algorithm which, for any given HG′ and node index e ∈ [n], appends row
vectors of appropriate types to T =
[
HG′
Ge
]
in such a way that successive decoding can be carried out.
We need some notation to describe the algorithm. Let λ′i be the number of encoding vectors of type i,
i ∈ [d], that are present in HG′ . Notice that λ′i ≤ θi ∀i ∈ [d]. Let λi denote the number of row vectors of
type i, i ∈ [d], that are present in T . Note that, for any e ∈ [n], Ge contains one row vector of each of the
d types. Thus, λi = λ′i + 1, ∀i ∈ [d]. This implies that λi ≤ θi + 1 ∀i ∈ [d]. Further, from (11), we have
that λi ∈ {1, 2} for all group II types i for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Let γ1 and γ2 denote the number of equations
that are required to decode the variables of group I and group II types, respectively, in a given iteration.
See algorithm 2 on next page.
First, we prove the correctness of the algorithm.
Claim 2. If algorithm 2 does not report a failure, it finds a solution to Z = T ′Y , where the construction
of T ′ is described in the algorithm.
Proof: In the same way as in the proof of claim 1, it is easy to prove by induction that in the first
for loop, the algorithm decodes for Y [I (i)] for 3 ≤ i ≤ k. Since each pair of group I types has one index
in common, k − 2 elements of each of the remaining types are decoded at the end of the first for loop.
Note that there are two rows each of types jd−L+1 through jd. Since k − 2 elements of each of them are
already decoded, the remaining two elements are decoded at line 17.
At line 25, all the remaining elements of I (2) will be decoded. At this point, there is only one un-
decoded element each in types jk+1 through jd−L, which will be decoded at line 28. Note that, at this
point, all the types from 2 through d have been decoded. Thus, there remains only one un-decoded element
of type 1 which will be decoded as the final step. For successive decoding, we rely on the fact that for
matrix Ψ˜e =
[
Ψˆ
Ψe
]
, any square sub-matrix is non-singular. Note that this condition holds by construction
1; e.g., when the matrix Ψ˜ is a Cauchy matrix.
Essentially, algorithm decodes the elements in all the d types in the following order (jk, jk−1, . . ., j3),
(jd−L+1, . . ., jd), (jk+1, . . ., jd−L), j2, j1, which covers all the B elements.
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Algorithm 2 Appending rows to T to form T ′ and carrying out successive decoding for Z = T ′Y (k ≥ 3)
1: Sort λj for j ∈ [k], Let λj1 ≤ · · · ≤ λjk
2: Sort λj for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, Let λjk+1 ≤ · · · ≤ λjd
3: Find L such that λjd−L+1 = λjd−L+2 = · · · = λjd = 2
4: {Notice that 0 ≤ L ≤ d− k}
5: Set γ1 = d, γ2 = k
6: for p = k to 3 do
7: if λjp > γ1 then
8: Declare failure, Exit
9: else
10: Append T with γ1 − λjp additional rows of type p with non-zero coefficients as the rows of Ψˆ
that are not present in the λjp rows of type p
11: Using the equations corresponding to the γ1 rows of type p, decode the un-decoded variables
from Y [I (p)]
12: γ1 = γ1 − 1, γ2 = γ2 − 1
13: end if
14: end for
15: {At this point, γ1 = d− (k − 2) and γ2 = k − (k − 2) = 2}
16: if L > 0 then
17: Successively decode the remaining variables from Y [I (jd−L+i)] for i ∈ [L]
18: γ1 = γ1 − L
19: end if
20: {At this point, γ1 = d− (k − 2)− L and γ2 = 2}
21: if λj2 > γ1 then
22: Declare failure, exit
23: else
24: Append T with γ1−λj2 additional rows of type 2 with non-zero coefficients as the rows of Ψˆ that
are not present in the λj2 rows of type 2
25: Decode the un-decoded variables from Y [I (2)]
26: γ1 = γ1 − 1, γ2 = γ2 − 1
27: {At this point, γ1 = d− (k − 2)− L− 1 and γ2 = 2− 1 = 1}
28: Decode for the remaining symbols from Y [I (jk+1)], Y [I (jk+2)], . . . , Y [I (jd−L)]
29: Append T with a row of type 1 with non-zero coefficients as the first row of Ψˆ
30: Decode the un-decoded variable from Y [I (1)]
31: end if
Next, we prove that the algorithm 2 does not declare a failure if the number rows in HG′ is bounded
below a threshold.
Claim 3. If |G ′| ≤ d+ k − 3, then algorithm 2 always succeeds.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose |G ′| ≤ d+ k − 3, and the algorithm fails.
Case 1: Algorithm fails on line 6, i.e., in the first iteration when p = k. This implies that λjk > γ1 = d.
However, we have
λjk = max
1≤l≤k
λl
(a)
≤ max
1≤l≤k
θl + 1
(b)
= d
where (a) follows from the fact that the number of rows of any type i in T is at most θi+1, i.e., λi ≤ θi+1
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∀i ∈ [d], and (b) is due to (11). This is a contradiction, and the algorithm cannot fail in the first iteration
when p = k.
Case 2: Algorithm fails in the first for loop during i-th iteration such that 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 2. Note that
this implies k ≥ 4. Also, at the i-th iteration, we have p = k − (i− 1).
Now, as γ1 is reduced by 1 in each iteration, in i-th iteration we have γ1 = d − (i − 1). Since the
algorithm failed, it should be that λjk−i+1 > d− (i− 1). Then, we can write
i∑
l=1
λjk−l+1
(c)
≥ iλjk−i+1
(d)
≥ i(d− i+ 2)
∴ i+
i∑
l=1
λ′jk−l+1 ≥ i(d− i+ 2) (17)
∴
i∑
l=1
λ′jk−l+1 ≥ i(d− i+ 1), (18)
where (c) is due to λjk ≥ λjk−1 ≥ · · · ≥ λjk−i+1 and (d) is due to λjk−i+1 > d− (i− 1). To get (17), we
use λl = λ
′
l + 1 ∀l ∈ [d].
First, note that |G ′| =
∑d
l=1 λ
′
l. Thus, |G ′| ≥
∑i
l=1 λ
′
jk−l+1
. Next, notice that f(i) = i(d − i + 2) is a
concave function in i and thus it will attain minimum over 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 2 at one of its boundary points.
Using these two observations along with (18), we have
|G ′| ≥ min{2(d− 1), (d− k + 3)(k − 2)}. (19)
Now, we show that both of these boundary points result in contradiction. First, since d ≥ k for any
regenerating code, clearly, 2(d − 1) − (d + k − 3) = d − k + 1 > 0, i.e., 2(d − 1) > d − k + 3. Next,
consider the second boundary point,
(d− k + 3)(k − 2)− (d+ k − 3)
(e)
= (k − 3)d− (k − 2)2 + 1
(f)
≥ (k − 3)k − (k − 2)2 + 1
= k − 3,
where (e) follows from algebraic manipulations, and (f) follows because for any regenerating code d ≥ k.
Finally, since k ≥ 4 in this case, we have (d − k + 2)(k − 2) > d + k − 3. Therefore, we have |G ′| ≥
min{2(d− 1), (d− k + 3)(k − 2)} > d+ k − 3, which is a contradiction.
Case 3: Algorithm fails at line 22, while considering type j2. It is easy to see that at this point
γ1 = d− (k− 2)−L and γ2 = 1. The failure implies that λj2 ≥ d− (k− 2)−L+1. Now, let us consider
the total number of rows in T corresponding to types that have been considered so far, as follows.
k∑
l=2
λjl +
d∑
m=d−L+1
λjm
(g)
≥
k∑
l=2
λj2 + 2L
(h)
≥ (k − 1)(d− k − L+ 3) + 2L, (20)
where (g) follows from λj2 ≤ λj3 ≤ · · · ≤ λjk and λjd−L+1 = λjd−L+2 = · · · = λjd = 2, and (h) follows
from λj2 ≥ d− (k − 2)− L+ 1. However, since λl = λ′l + 1 for each l ∈ [d], from (20), we can write
k∑
l=2
λ′jl +
d∑
m=d−L+1
λ′jm ≥ (k − 1)(d− k − L+ 3)− (k − 1) + L
= (k − 1)(d− k − L+ 2) + L. (21)
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Algorithm 3 Appending T and carrying out successive decoding for k = 2
1: Sort λj for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, Let λjk+1 ≤ · · · ≤ λjd
2: Find L such that λjd−L+1 = λjd−L+2 = · · · = λjd = 2
3: {Notice that 0 ≤ L ≤ d− k}
4: Set γ1 = d, γ2 = k = 2
5: if L > 0 then
6: for p = 1 to L do
7: Using the equations corresponding to the γ2 rows of type d−L+p, decode the variables indexed
by I (d− L+ p)
8: Set γ1 = γ1 − 1
9: end for
10: end if
11: {At this point, γ1 = d− L}
12: if λjk > γ1 then
13: Declare failure, exit
14: else
15: Append T with γ1 − λjk additional rows of type k = 2 with non-zero coefficients as the rows of
Ψˆ that are not present in the λj2 rows of type 2
16: Decode the un-decoded variables from Y [I (2)]
17: γ1 = γ1 − 1, γ2 = γ2 − 1
18: {At this point, γ1 = d− L− 1 and γ2 = 2− 1 = 1}
19: Decode for the remaining symbols from Y [I (jk+1)], Y [I (jk+2)], . . . , Y [I (jd−L)]
20: Append T with a row of type 1 with non-zero coefficients as the first row of Ψˆ
21: Decode the un-decoded variable from Y [I (1)]
22: end if
After some manipulations, it is straightforward to show that (k − 1)(d− k −L+ 2) +L− (d+ k − 3) =
(d− k − L)(k − 2) + 1, which is strictly positive for k ≥ 3 as d ≥ k and 0 ≤ L ≤ d− k. Therefore, we
have
|G ′| =
d∑
l=1
λ′jl ≥
k∑
l=2
λ′jl +
d∑
m=d−L+1
λ′jm
(o)
≥ (k − 1)(d− k − L+ 2) + L
(r)
> d+ k − 3, (22)
where (o) follows from (21) and (r) is proved in the previous point. However, this is a contradiction,
which completes the proof for k ≥ 3.
Case 2: k = 2.
We present the algorithm for successive decoding as follows.
First, we prove the correctness of the algorithm.
Claim 4. If algorithm 3 does not report a failure, it finds a solution to Z = T ′Y , where T ′ is the matrix
resulting after appending the rows to T as described in the algorithm.
Proof: As showed in the discussion before claim 3, notice that there are two elements each in I (l)
for k + 1 ≤ l ≤ d. For the L types, jd−L+1 through jd, there are two rows present in T . Thus, all the
variables from I (jl) for d− L+ 1 ≤ l ≤ d are decoded at line 7.
Algorithm will decode all the un-decoded variables indexed by I (k = 2) at line 16. Then, there remains
only one un-decoded element of types jk+1 through jd−L, which will be decoded in line 19. At this point,
there remains only single un-decoded variable from type 1, ant it is decoded as the final step.
Essentially, algorithm covers all the d types in the order (jd−L+1, . . ., jd), (j(k=2)), (jk+1, . . ., jd−L+1),
j1, and decodes all the B elements.
Claim 5. If |G ′| ≤ d+ k − 3 = d− 1, algorithm 3 always succeeds.
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Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose |G ′| and the algorithm fails. The only possibility of
failure is line 13. Consider the total number of rows in T that have been considered till this point as
follows.
d∑
m=d−L+1
λjm + λj2
(a)
≥ (d− L+ 1) + 2L
∴
d∑
m=d−L+1
λ′jm + L+ λj2 + 1 ≥ d+ L+ 1, (23)
∴
d∑
m=d−L+1
λ′jm + λj2 ≥ d, (24)
where (a) follows because failure implies λj2 > d−L. To get (23), we use λjl = λ′jl +1 for each l ∈ [d].
Now, we can write
|G ′| =
d∑
l=1
λ′jl
≥
d∑
m=d−L+1
λ′jm + λj2
(b)
≥ d, (25)
where (b) is due to (24). However, |G ′| ≥ d is a contradiction and the proof follows.
Case 3: k = 1.
Notice that for k = 1, Eve gets the same degrees of freedom as a data collector (which accesses to k
nodes to recover the file). Therefore, it is not possible to achieve any form of security since, similar to
the data collector, Eve can also decode the complete file
Example: Consider one possible matrix T as shown in (26). First, append one row of type 4 and decode
for the variables indexed by I (4) = {4, 7, 9}. Then, add one row of type 3 and decode for the variables
indexed by I (3) \ ((I (4) ∩ I (3))) = {3, 6, 8}. Using the two rows of type 2, decode for the variables
indexed by I (2) \ ((I (4) ∩ I (2)) ∪ (I (3) ∩ I (2))) = {2, 5}. Finally, using a row of type 1, decode for
the variable indexed by I (1) \ ((I (1) ∩ I (4)) ∪ (I (1) ∩ I (3)) ∪ (I (1) ∩ I (2))) = {1}. The non-zero
coefficients of the appended rows are specified by the appropriate rows of Ψˆ, and the successive decoding
is feasible due to the property that any square sub-matrix of the Cauchy matrix Ψ˜ =
[
Ψ
Ψˆ
]
is non-singular.
T =
[
HG′
Ge
]
=


0 Ψˆ(2, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(2, 2) Ψˆ(2, 3) Ψˆ(2, 4) 0 0
0 0 Ψˆ(3, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(3, 2) 0 Ψˆ(3, 3) Ψˆ(3, 4)
0 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 1) 0 0 Ψˆ(1, 2) 0 Ψˆ(1, 3)
Ψ(e, 1) Ψ(e, 2) Ψ(e, 3) Ψ(e, 4) 0 0 0 0 0
0 Ψ(e, 1) 0 0 Ψ(e, 2) Ψ(e, 3) Ψ(e, 4) 0 0
0 0 Ψ(e, 1) 0 0 Ψ(e, 2) 0 Ψ(e, 3) Ψ(e, 4)
0 0 0 Ψ(e, 1) 0 0 Ψ(e, 2) 0 Ψ(e, 3)


(26)
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